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Conway and Kochen have presented a “free will theorem” [4, 6] which they claim
shows that “if indeed we humans have free will, then [so do] elementary particles.”
In a more precise fashion, they claim it shows that for certain quantum experiments
in which the experimenters can choose between several options, no deterministic or
stochastic model can account for the observed outcomes without violating a condition
“MIN” motivated by relativistic symmetry. We point out that for stochastic models this
conclusion is not correct, while for deterministic models it is not new.
In the way the free will theorem is formulated and proved, it only concerns determin-
istic models. But Conway and Kochen have argued [4, 5, 6, 7] that “randomness can’t
help,” meaning that stochastic models are excluded as well if we insist on the conditions
“SPIN”, “TWIN”, and “MIN”. We point out a mistake in their argument. Namely, the
theorem is of the form
deterministic model with SPIN & TWIN & MIN ⇒ contradiction , (1)
and in order to derive the further claim, which is of the form
stochastic model with SPIN & TWIN & MIN ⇒ contradiction , (2)
Conway and Kochen propose a method for converting any stochastic model into a de-
terministic one [4]:
“let the stochastic element . . . be a sequence of random numbers (not all
of which need be used by both particles). Although these might only be
generated as needed, it will plainly make no difference to let them be
given in advance.” [emphasis added]
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In this way, (2) would be a corollary of (1) if the conversion preserved the properties
SPIN, TWIN, and MIN. However, Conway and Kochen have neglected to check whether
they are preserved, and indeed, as we will show, the conversion preserves only SPIN
and TWIN but not MIN. We do so by exhibiting a simple example of a stochastic
model satisfying SPIN, TWIN, and MIN. As a consequence, no method of conversion
of stochastic models into deterministic ones can preserve SPIN, TWIN, and MIN. More
directly, our example shows that (2) is false. Contrary to the emphasized part of the
above quotation, letting the randomness be given in advance makes a big difference for
the purpose at hand.
The relevant details are as follows. The reasoning concerns a certain experiment in
which, after a preparation procedure, two experimenters (A and B), located in space-
time regions that are spacelike separated, can each choose between several options for
running the experiment. We denote by a (resp., by b) the choice of A (resp., of B) and by
OA (resp., OB) the outcome of A (resp., of B). The data collected from this experiment
can be represented by a joint probability distribution Pab(OA, OB) for the outcomes
(OA, OB) that depends on the choices (a, b). Experimenter A chooses a = (x, y, z) from
a certain set of 40 orthonormal bases of R3, B chooses b = w from a certain set of 33
unit vectors in R3. SPIN asserts that the outcome OA obtained by A is always one of
the triples 110, 101, or 011, and the outcome OB obtained by B is either 0 or 1. TWIN
asserts that whenever w = x (resp., w = y/w = z) then OB coincides with the first
(resp., second/third) digit of OA. Quantum mechanics predicts data Pab(OA, OB) that
satisfy SPIN and TWIN, given explicitly in Table 1.
Pab OB = 0 OB = 1
OA = 011
1
3
(w · x)2 1
3
[1− (w · x)2]
OA = 101
1
3
(w · y)2 1
3
[1− (w · y)2]
OA = 110
1
3
(w · z)2 1
3
[1− (w · z)2]
Table 1: Joint probability distribution of outcomes as predicted by quantum mechanics,
with · denoting the scalar product of vectors in R3
A stochastic model for the data Pab(OA, OB) means, for the purpose at hand, a
probability measure PΛ (that does not depend on a and b) on some measurable space
Λ and, for each λ ∈ Λ and a and b, a probability measure Pab(OA, OB|λ) on the set
{110, 101, 011} × {0, 1} of possible outcomes such that, when λ is averaged over with
P
Λ, the data Pab(OA, OB) are obtained:
Pab(OA, OB) =
∫
Λ
Pab(OA, OB|λ) dP
Λ(λ). (3)
A deterministic model for the data Pab(OA, OB) is a stochastic model such that each
Pab(OA, OB|λ) is supported by a single outcome, i.e., one for which there are functions
θA and θB such that:
Pab
(
OA = θA(a, b, λ), OB = θB(a, b, λ)|λ
)
= 1, (4)
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for all a, b, and λ.
The MIN condition is formulated in a somewhat vague way [6]:
“The MIN Axiom: Assume that the experiments performed by A and
B are space-like separated. Then experimenter B can freely choose any one
of the 33 particular directions w, and [OA] is independent of this choice.
Similarly and independently, A can freely choose any one of the 40 triples
x, y, z, and [OB] is independent of that choice.”
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What does MIN mean for a deterministic model? According to Conway and Kochen [6]:
“It is possible to give a more precise form of MIN by replacing the phrase
‘[OB] is independent of A’s choice’ by ‘if [OA] is determined by B’s choice,
then its value does not vary with that choice.’”
That is, MIN asserts that the function θA does not depend on b and the function θB
does not depend on a:
θA(a, b, λ) = θA(a, λ) , θB(a, b, λ) = θB(b, λ) . (5)
What does MIN mean for a stochastic model? Conway and Kochen do not say precisely,
as the above quotation deals only with the case of a deterministic model (“if [OA] is
determined by B’s choice”), but the most reasonable interpretation is a condition known
as parameter independence [11, 12]: for any given λ, the distribution of OA does not
depend on b, and the distribution of OB does not depend on a:
Pab(OA|λ) = Pa(OA|λ) , Pab(OB|λ) = Pb(OB|λ) . (6)
Note that for deterministic models (6) is the same as (5).
An example of a stochastic model satisfying SPIN, TWIN, and MIN (understood
as (6)) is obtained from “rGRWf”, the relativistic Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theory with
flash ontology [14, 15], but much simpler examples are possible. As a second exam-
ple, one may simply take (Λ,PΛ) to be the trivial probability space containing just one
element (so that λ is a constant and can be ignored). Then, according to the defini-
tion of stochastic models, the data themselves form a stochastic model. That is, take
Pab(OA, OB|λ) = Pab(OA, OB) as given by Table 1. We know that this stochastic model
satisfies SPIN and TWIN, and it also satisfies (6), since, for all a and b, the marginal
distribution of OA is uniform and the marginal distribution of OB gives probability 1/3
to 0 and 2/3 to 1. As a third (and even simpler) example, let us drop the requirement
(3) that the stochastic model agrees with the data predicted by quantum mechanics and
focus just on satisfying SPIN, TWIN and MIN. Take (Λ,Pλ) to be trivial as before. If
b = w coincides with coordinate x (resp., y/z) of a then let Pab(OA, OB|λ) give probabil-
ity 1/3 to each of (110, 1), (101, 1), (011, 0) (resp., to each of (110, 1), (101, 0), (011, 1)/to
each of (110, 0), (101, 1), (011, 1)) and probability zero to the other three possible values
1Here and in the following quotation, we have adapted the notation by putting [OA] for “a’s response”
and [OB ] for “b’s response.”
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of (OA, OB). If w coincides with none of x, y, z then let Pab(OA, OB|λ) give probability
1/9 to each of (110, 0), (101, 0), (011, 0) and probability 2/9 to each of (110, 1), (101, 1),
(011, 1). Then SPIN and TWIN are obviously true, and (6) is true because the marginal
distributions of OA and OB are the same as in the previous example.
To illustrate explicitly why (6) breaks down when putting all randomness in the past,
let us consider a specific conversion method of stochastic models into deterministic ones
that Conway and Kochen have proposed [6] in response to earlier criticisms of their
claims concerning the viability of rGRWf [15]:
“we can easily deal with the dependence of the distribution of flashes
on the external fields FA [= a] and FB [= b], which arise from the two
experimenters’ choices of directions x, y, z, and w. There are 40× 33 = 1320
possible fields in question. For each such choice, we have a distribution
X(FA, FB) of flashes, i.e., we have different distributions X1, X2, . . . , X1320.
Let us be given ‘in advance’ all such random sequences, with their different
weightings as determined by the different fields. Note that for this to be
given, nature does not have to know in advance the actual free choices FA
(i.e., x, y, z) and FB (i.e., w) of the experimenters. Once the choices are
made, nature need only refer to the relevant random sequence Xk
in order to emit the flashes in accord with rGRWf.” [emphasis added]
The problem here is that the deterministic model obtained from this method of con-
version manifestly violates MIN because if nature were to follow the recipe suggested
in the emphasized part of the quotation above then she would have to use the value of
k = k(x, y, z, w) depending on both experimenters’ choices, a = (x, y, z), and b = w, in
order to produce any of the outcomes OA, OB.
The conclusion that there are some predictions of quantum theory that cannot be
obtained by a deterministic model satisfying parameter independence is not new. As
noted by Jarrett in 1984 [11], for a stochastic model Bell’s locality condition [1, 2]
Pab(OA, OB|λ) = Pa(OA|λ)Pb(OB|λ) (7)
is (straightforwardly) equivalent to the conjunction of parameter independence (6) and
another condition known as outcome independence,
Pab(OA|OB, λ) = Pab(OA|λ) , Pab(OB|OA, λ) = Pab(OB|λ) . (8)
For a deterministic model, (8) is always trivially satisfied, as the distributions Pab(OA|λ)
and Pab(OB|λ) each assign probability 1 to a single outcome so any further information
(like the other outcome) is redundant. Thus, for a deterministic model, parameter inde-
pendence is equivalent to locality, which Bell showed in 1964 [1] to be incompatible with
some predictions of quantum mechanics. Therefore, deterministic models in agreement
with quantum predictions must violate parameter independence. Even from the very
same experiment as considered by Conway and Kochen, this conclusion was derived
before in [13, 10, 3, 8] and [9, Section 4.2.1], in [9] using only SPIN and TWIN.
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It has been suggested to one of us (R.T.) by Simon Kochen that our understanding
of MIN is too weak, that MIN should be regarded as requiring that the actual outcome
itself of A be independent of B’s choice, and not just its probability distribution. We
are unable to see why this is a reasonable requirement for a stochastic theory—or even
what exactly it should mean. Be that as it may, the existence of the examples described
here demonstrates that any such variant of MIN for a stochastic model would either be
unreasonable (or worse) or would fail to be preserved under conversion of the model to
a deterministic one.
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